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In this paper we challenge basic results of signaling models. In our banking model each project of a borrower is 
described by a continuous density of outcomes. Diﬀerent density functions are classiﬁed according to second 
stochastisch dominance. Combining these features we ﬁnd that in a banking model collateral is no longer in a position 
to signal the degree of riskiness of the borrower to the lender. In most cases the equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium. 
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An important goal of economic theory is to understand what allocation mech-
anisms, or institutions, are best suited to minimize the economic losses gener-
ated by private information. Asymmetric information are a typical problems
in the asset and liability management of banking ﬁrms.1 When will a mar-
ket mechanism suﬃce to allocate resources eﬃciently? As it turned out, the
market implements eﬃcient outcomes only under very stringent conditions.
The basic problem is that borrowers have an incentive to economize with
their private information. To overcome this problem a collateral oﬀered by
a borrower is often viewed as a credible signal of the riskiness of the project.
Signaling with collateral seems to be an eﬃcient procedure of information
transmission. This paper challenges this view. We argue that under regular
conditions there is no way to convey private information by the collateral
amount oﬀered by a borrower and hence there is no way to derive a separat-
ing equilibirum. In general, our model is characterized either by a pooling
equilibrium or no equilibrium at all.
For the most part, a bank‘s lending decision takes place in an asymmetric
information environment. Typically, the bank is the information outsider and
the borrower is the information insider. In order to overcome the information
gap, signaling activities do help to convey information to the bank. Because
of his insider status the borrower knows the probability distribution of his
projects cash ﬂow with certainty. The bank does not know these details.
All the bank knows by assumption is that the borrowers project quality is
either a low risk or a high risk. A signaling process is bound to identify the
members of diﬀerent classes. The existing literature is able to proof that a
ﬁnancial contract using collateral as a signal is able to overcome the asym-
metric information problem and separate the borrowers.2 In contrast to this
position, we are going to demonstrate that there is no way for collaterals to
convey valuable information from the information insider to the outsider.
In our paper, we challenge this result. According to our reasoning col-
lateral is not in a position to overcome the informational asymmetry. The
reason is that we are no longer arguing in a world with only two outcomes. In
the papers mentioned above there are only two outcomes existing. Based on
this assumption the authors are in a position to show that signaling matters.
1See, for example, Broecker (1990), Wong (1992), (1998), Eckwert and Zilcha (2003),
Broll and Eckwert (2006).
2See Bester (1987), Besanko and Thakor (1987), Chan and Kanatas (1985), Milde and
Riley (1988). For an overview, see, Freixas and Rochet (1997).
2In contrast, we are going to analyse the problem in a world with a continuum
of outcomes.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the standard model
and the role of collateral in credit markets with asymmetric information.
The perfect Bayesian equilibrium is developed in section 3. In section 4
we demonstrate the impossibility of a separating equilibrium with collateral.
Section 5 contains concluding remarks.
2 The model
In this section we are going to discuss the basic structure of a signaling con-
tract. For example, the collateral oﬀered by a borrower can be considered as
a signal of the unobservable degree of riskiness of the entrepreneur’s project.
As conﬁrmed in banking models the unobservable quality is revealed by an
observable action. A perfectly revealing signal enables the information out-
sider to infer on the a priori knowledge of the information insider.
Bank credit analysts have typically referred to collateral as an important
factor to predict a borrowers default probability. In order to overcome the
basic informational asymmetry the logic of a signaling contract can be ex-
plained as follows. A borrower with a high risk project has a great aversion to
putting up collateral because he knows about the great probability of loosing
it. Exploiting this property, the banker can oﬀer the borrower two alternative
contracts: a secured loan and a unsecured loan. In a signaling contract, each
amount of collateral is linked to one and only one loan rate or repayment
obligation. If the combination of collateral and loan rate is properly designed
the borrower has an incentive to choose exactly the contract that is intended
for his type of riskiness. This process is called self selecting or truth revealing.
There are diﬀerent instruments available to set up a signaling contract,
i.e. loan size, collateral, maturity, covenants. Mostly, the existing literature
is able to proof and conﬁrm the separating solution. The purpose of our pa-
per is to prove that this result is true only under very restrictive assumptions.
The following assumptions about the lender-borrower relationship are
considered in our model. There are two risk neutral decision makers, a bank
B and an entreprenuer, E, i.e. the borrower. The bank is an information
outsider and the borrower is the information insider. Two diﬀerent classes
of borrowers exist: borrowers of class z1 have a low risk project; borrowers
of class z2 have a high risk project. The bank knows this but is unable to
3tell who is who. From past experience the the proportions of the risk classes
are know; class z1 occurs with λ%a n dc l a s sz2 occurs with (1 − λ)% and
0 <λ<1.
The cash ﬂow of type zi is a nonnegative random variable x with a den-
sity f(x;zi) and cumulative distribution function F(x;zi)f o ri =1 ,2. The
expected values x are identical. For both types the maximum cash ﬂow is S
with 0 <S<∞. In addition, we assume f(x;zi) > 0 for all x ∈ [0,S]a n d
f(x,zi) = 0 for all x/ ∈ [0,S],i=1 ,2.
The riskiness of both types is deﬁned as follows: type z1 exhibits second





for all t ∈ [0,S]. Both types exhibit an identical initial project outlay l which
is exogenously given, assuming l<x. The signaling contract is characterized
by the collateral c and repayment obligation L with with c ≤ ˆ l,w h e r eˆ l is
any pre-speciﬁed number 0 < ˆ l<l .
The operating cash ﬂows of the project are assigned to the bank and to
the borrower contingent on the diﬀerent states of the world. The borrower is
in a position to repay the predetermined obligation or, alternatively, he/she
is not able to do so. The sources of the repayment are the projects cash
ﬂow on the one hand and the liquidation cash ﬂow of the collateral c on the
other hand, that is x + c. If the cash ﬂow is suﬃciently large to permit the
repayment, the borrower will do so. Thus, the bank receives the full amount
of the predetermined repayment. The residual amount goes to the borrower.
If the project’s cash ﬂow is not suﬃcient, the bank takes all available cash
ﬂows leaving the borrower with a loss of his collateral.
Indicating the banks and the borrower’s cash ﬂow by uB and uE, respec-
tively, and the deﬁnition of ˆ x = L − c, we ﬁnd:
uB =

L − l if x ≥ ˆ x,
x + c − l if x<ˆ x.
uE =

l + x − L if x ≥ ˆ x,
l − c if x<ˆ x.
From cash ﬂows we obtain the expected net cash ﬂow of the bank, R,a n d














(x − L)f(x;zi)dx + l
The expected cash ﬂows R(c,L;zi)a n dP(c,L;zi) sum up to the expected
value of the projects operating cash ﬂows:
 S
0 xf(x;zi)dx = x.
3 The perfect Bayesian equilibrium
The equilibrium concept employed is the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE).
AP B Ei sat u p e l( c∗,L ∗,∗ )w i t hc∗ =( c∗
1,c ∗
2). The collateral amounts ac-
cepted by borrowers of both risk classes are denoted by c∗
1 and c∗
2, respectively.
The term ∗ indicates the banks beliefs on the borrower risk class. Depending
on the amounts c∗
1 and c∗
2, the bank is in a position to revise its beliefs (c).
In other words, (c) ∈ [0,1] is the probability as seen by the bank that the
borrower is a z1 type (low risk) and (1 − (c)) is the proability of a z2 type
(high risk).
Now we discuss in detail the signaling contract. The bank designs sig-
naling contracts by combining alternative repayment obligations L with al-
ternative amounts of collateral c ≤ ˆ l. The lender can oﬀer a menu of loan
contracts based on the bank’s beliefs (c) contingent on the class zi. Therefore
the expected net payoﬀ of the bank is given by
(c)R(x,L;z1)+( 1− (c))R(c,L;z2).
We deﬁne the expected gross payoﬀ of a type zi borrower by
R
g(c,L;zi)=R(c,L;zi)+l.
Assuming a competitive banking industry the banks expected proﬁt is driven
down to zero. Hence the contract {c,L} satisﬁes the zeroproﬁt condition
(c)R
g(c,L;z1)+( 1− (c))R
g(c,L;z2) − l =0 .
In order to derive the properties of the signaling contract we calculate the
marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between L and c. The MRS is the ab-
solute value of the slope of the indiﬀerence curves in the (c,L)-diagram.
5It will be shown below that the indiﬀerence curve of a prespeciﬁed class
zi is strictly decreasing and strictly convex. The relevant interval is [0,ˆ l]
with 0 < ˆ l<l . The graph c → Li(c) is identical to the indiﬀerence curve
of the type i borrower given the level x. The function Li(c) is deﬁned by
R(c,Li(c);zi)=0 .A sF(·;z1) is dominating F(·;z2) in the sense of SSD, we
ﬁnd L1(c) ≤ L2(c) for all c ∈ [0,ˆ l]. Next we claim
Proposition 1 The slope of the indiﬀerence curve of a borrower of type i is
given by −p(c,L;zi)/(1−p(c,L;zi)) =
 ˆ x
0 f(x;zi)dx with p(c,L;zi) denoting
the probability of the project zi ﬁnanced with a bank loan whose underlying
contract.
Proof The indiﬀerence curve of type i borrower at level α is given by (c,L):
P(c,L;zi)=α.F o r F(c,L;zi)=P(c,L;zi) − α,t h eα−curve is implicitly
deﬁned by F(c,L;zi)=0 .L e tF1 and F2 denote the partial derivative of F
with respect to c and L, respectively. We get the following expression for the














α, we ﬁnd F1(c,L;zi)=−
 ˆ x
0 f(x;zi)dx and F2(c,L;zi)=−
 S
ˆ x f(x;zi)dx =
−[1 −
 ˆ x
0 f(x;zi)dx]. The claim follows.
From the discussion we obtain the following
Corollary The indiﬀerence curves of borrowers are strictly monotonously
decreasing.














Proposition 3 Since F(·;z2) is a mean preserving spread of F(·;z1),h e n c e
L1(c) ≤ L2(c) holds for all c ∈ [0,ˆ l].
6Proof Assume the contrary to the claim that there is a c ∈ [0,ˆ l]w i t hL1(c) >
L2(c). Then, there is a number ε>0 such that L2(c)=L1(c) − ε.U s i n g
ˆ xi = Li(c)−c and noticing that
 ˆ xi
0 xf(x;zi)dx =ˆ xiF(ˆ xi;zi)−
 ˆ xi
0 F(x;zi)dx,


















=ˆ xiF(ˆ xi;zi) −
 ˆ xi
0





T h u s ,w ew i n du pw i t hL2(c)=l+
 L2(c)−c







L1(c)−ε−c F(x;z2)dx > l +
 L1(c)−c
0 F(x;z1)dx − ε =
L1(c) − ε. The inequality is valid according to SSD. Note that Li(0) <S
implies Li(c) <Sfor all c ∈ [0,ˆ l]. Thus, we get L1(c) − ε<L 2(c). How-
ever this is in contradiction to L1(c) − ε = L2(c)f o rc chosen above there
exists no c with L1(c) >L 2(c). Therefore, L1(c) ≤ L2(c) is valid for all c ≥ 0.
Finally,
 ˆ x
0 xf(x;zi)dx =ˆ xF(ˆ x;zi) −
 ˆ x
0 F(x;zi)dx remains to be shown.
Note that the antiderivative of xf(x;zi)i sg i v e nb yH(x;zi)=xF(x;zi) −  ˆ x
0 [
 y























The claim has been proven.
4 Properties of the solutions
In this section we are going to discuss two diﬀerent cases in order to prove
our ﬁndings. (A) L1(c) <L 2(c) for all c ∈ [0,ˆ l]a n d( B )L1(c)=L2(c) for all
c ∈ [0,ˆ l].
(A) There is a separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) (ˆ σ, ˆ μ)w i t h
ˆ σ =( ( ˆ c1,ˆ c2), ˆ L(·)) and ˆ c1,ˆ c2 ∈ [0,ˆ l], ˆ c1  =ˆ c2. As a result, there is an incentive
7c
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Figure 1: Preference maps of borrowers
for the type z2 borrower to choose the contract characterized by ˆ c1 instead
of ˆ c2. Given this choice the type z2 borrower is in a position to improve his
situation by achieving a higher indiﬀerence curve.
However, in (˜ σ, ˜ μ)w i t h˜ σ =( ( ˜ c1,˜ c2), ˜ L(·)), with ˜ c1 =˜ c2 =˜ c =∈ [0,ˆ l]w e
ﬁnd a pooling PBE if ˜ L(·) is chosen in such a way that its graph is located
above the indiﬀerence curve of type z1 borrower and type z2 borrower through
the point (˜ c, ˜ L(˜ c)), illustrated by point A in Figure 1. ˜ L is chosen in such a
way that its graph is strictly above both indiﬀerence curves, apart from the
point (˜ c, ˜ L(˜ c)).
The value ˜ L(˜ c)i sg i v e nb y˜ L = Lλ(c)w i t hLλ being deﬁned by the zero
proﬁt condition λRg(c,Lλ(c);z1)+( 1− λ)Rg(c,Lλ(c);z2) − l =0 ,c∈ [0,ˆ l].
The mapping c → Lλ(c), c ∈ [0,ˆ l] is called the pooling line. Note that the
beliefs of the bank, ˜ μ(·), are generated according to the zeroproﬁt condition
in correspondence with ˜ L(·). This particular choice of ˜ L is possible, if and
only if the type z1 borrower’s indiﬀerence curve through the point (˜ c, ˜ L(˜ c)),
illustrated by A in Figure 1, does not intersect the graph of c → L2(c), i.e.
type 2 line in the Figure 1, which is the type z2 borrower’s indiﬀerence curve
with index ¯ x. Due to zeroproﬁt condition L1(c) < ˜ L(c) ≤ L2(c)i ss a t i s ﬁ e d
for all c ∈ [0,ˆ l].
Such a situation is given if the low risk project is characterized by the
smaller default probability of all loan contracts {c,L} with the exclusion of
8the full cover contract {l,L}, i.e., if p(c,L;z1) <p (c,L;z2)h o l d sf o ra l lc o n -
tracts with 0 ≤ c<land l ≤ L<S .F o r˜ L(˜ c)w i t h˜ c = ˆ l the zero proﬁt
condition, λRg(˜ c, ˜ L(˜ c);z1)+(1−λ)Rg(˜ c, ˜ L(˜ c);z2)−l = 0, is satisﬁed. The re-
sulting pair (˜ c, ˜ L(˜ c)) = (ˆ l, ˜ L(ˆ l)) constitutes a pooling equilibrium. The reason
is that the indiﬀerence of type z1 borrower through (ˆ l, ˜ L(ˆ l)) does not intersect
the graph of c → L2(c), i.e., type 2 line in Figure 1. To this end, consider the
indiﬀerence curve of type z1 and type z2 through (ˆ l, ˜ L(ˆ l)). Note that type z1’s
MRS, i.e. p(ˆ l, ˜ L(ˆ l);z1))/1 − p(ˆ l, ˜ L(ˆ l);z1), at that point is smaller than type
z2’s MRS, i.e. p(ˆ l, ˜ L(ˆ l);z2))/1 − p(ˆ l, ˜ L(ˆ l);z2), due to the assumption on the
default probabilities. Note that type z1’s indiﬀerence curve through (ˆ l, ˜ L(ˆ l))
is strictly below type z2’s indiﬀerence curve through that point regarding
the interval [0,ˆ l], apart from the point (ˆ l, ˜ L(ˆ l)) of course, again due to the
assumption on the default probabilities. This prevents an intersection from
taking place.
(B) Now we consider another case which is characterized by the existence
of a c ∈ [0,ˆ l]w i t hL1(c)=L2(c). This is indeed an irrelevant special case.
However, there is a separating equilibrium. Suppose there is a ¯ c ∈ [0,ˆ l]w i t h
L1(c)=L2(c). As a result, we ﬁnd that (¯ σ, ¯ μ)w i t h¯ σ =( ( ¯ c1,¯ c2), ¯ L(·)) is a
separating PBE if ¯ c1 =¯ c with ¯ c2  =¯ c,a n d¯ L(c)=L2(c)h o l d sf o ra l lc ∈ [0,ˆ l].
In addition, the beliefs are given by ¯ μ(¯ c)=1a n d¯ μ(c) = 0 for all c ∈ [0,ˆ l]
with c  =¯ c. Note that the beliefs ¯ μ are consistent with the choice ¯ L(·)a c -
cording to zeroproﬁt condition.
Three additional comments are in order.
(i) In case B any ¯ c ∈ [0,ˆ l]w i t hL1(¯ c)=L2(¯ c) constitutes a perfect pooling
equilibrium as well. Given ˘ c1 =˘ c2 =¯ c and ˘ L(c)=L2(c) for all c ∈ [0,ˆ l], we
ﬁnd that (˘ σ, ˘ μ)w i t h˘ σ =( ( ˘ c1,˘ c2),L(·)) is a PBE. The precondition for this
result is that the formation of beliefs is based on ˘ μ(¯ c)=λ and ˘ μ(c)=0f o r
all c ∈ [0,ˆ l]w i t hc  =¯ c.
(ii) In B any pooling equilibrium is based on ¯ c ∈ [0,ˆ l]w i t hL1(c)=L2(c).
Suppose a perfect pooling equilibrium (˘ σ, ˘ μ)w i t h˘ σ =( ( ˘ c1,˘ c2), ˘ L(·)) and
L1(˘ c) <L 2(˘ c)f o r˘ c1,˘ c2 =˘ c with ˘ c ∈ [0,ˆ l]. ˘ L(˘ c)i sg i v e nb yλRg(˘ c, ˘ L(˘ c);z1)+
(1 − λ)Rg(˘ c, ˘ L(˘ c);z2)=l. In this situation there is an incentive for type zi
borrowers to unilaterally deviate from the original contract by choosing a
collateral ¯ c ∈ [0,ˆ l]w i t hL1(¯ c)=L2(¯ c) because there is a possibility to be
better oﬀ. Note that ˘ L(¯ c)=L1(¯ c)=L2(¯ c)a n dL1(˘ c) < ˘ L(˘ c) < ˘ L2(˘ c).
(iii) If there is a separating equilibrium, the type zi borrower can achieve
9an expected payoﬀ ¯ x. The same payoﬀ holds in case B for all perfect pooling
equilibria. As a consequence, all equilibria in B are characterized by identical
payoﬀs.
We summerize our ﬁndings in an impossibility
Theorem Given a continuum of outcomes of the borrowers risky invest-
ment and projects are classiﬁed by second order stochastic dominance. Then
collaterals are no longer devices for screening heterogenous borrowers.
The proof follows from the above discussion.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we challenge basic results of signaling models in the credit mar-
ket. In banking literature collateral is considered a very powerful instrument
to convey valuable information from the borrower to the bank. As a result
the bank is in a position to sort and classify its borrowers according to the
degree of riskiness. A perequisite for this result is the introduction of some
very strong and simplify assumptions. The most important assumption is a
world with only two possible outcomes to the random cash ﬂow.
In our model each risky project is described by a continous density of
outcomes. Moreover, density functions are classiﬁed according to the concept
of second order stochastic dominance. Combining these two features we
ﬁnd that collateral is no longer in a position to signal the unoberservable
degree of riskness to the information outsider, i.e. the bank. As a result, a
signaling contract is not able to sort and classify the borrowers. Under regular
conditions there is hardly a way to derive a separating equilibrium in our
model. In most cases the equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium. Alternatively,
an equilibrium does not exist.
If there is no possibility to convey valuable information, the credit market
is characterized by adverse selection and quantity rationing. Credit rationing
will occure again. According to our analysis, there is no reason to be very
optimistic with respect to the application of signaling concepts to banking
issues. Generally speaking, many frictions and imperfections will continue to
dominate the features of ﬁnancial markets.
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